“Symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are ‘constructed’: methodological and epistemic consequences”, Synthese, forthcoming, PRE-PRINT PDF

“Scientific Perspectivism and Psychiatric Diagnoses: Respecting History and Constraining Relativism”, European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Journal link, PRE-PRINT PDF

“The Value of Categorical, Polythetic Psychiatric Diagnoses”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming, PRE-PRINT PDF

“Additional Challenges to Fair Representation in Autistic Advocacy” (Commentary), American Journal of Bioethics, 2020,

“The Importance of Getting Kanner’s Account Right in Debates over First Descriptions of Autism” (Letter to the Editor), Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorder, 2020,

“Scientific Realism, Antirealism and Psychiatric Diagnoses” in the Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Psychiatry, 2019,

Symptom modelling can be influenced by psychiatric categories: Choices for RDoC, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2017, 38/4, 279-294

Putting the Present in the History of Autism, Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2017, 61, 54-58 [Click for PDF]

Joint winner of the 2016 Jaspers Award from the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry

“A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky’s account of validity”, (in the annual philosophy issue of) Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2016, 22/4, 522-529

“Did Kanner actually describe the first account of autism? The mystery of 1938″, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 2015, 45/7, 2274-2276[Click for PDF]

Book Review of “Alternative Perspectives On Psychiatric Validation: DSM, ICD, RDoC, and Beyond”, issue of History of Psychiatry, 2015, 26/4, 499-501